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TAX FORUM
BARBARA M. WRIGHT, CPA
Ernst & Ernst
Tampa, Florida

(Estate) and found that the four gifts had
been made “in contemplation of death.” The
Court’s reasoning for its decision was clearly
based on the inability of the taxpayer to pre
sent specific evidence of life motive. There had
been no indication that the decedent’s daugh
ter had either needed the money or intended
to use it for traveling, a new home, education,
hobbies, etc., or that Mrs. Harrell’s purpose
was to avoid income taxes. The Court also
stated that in so holding it did not intend to
enable the government to rely on Sec. 2035(b)
as a virtually irrebuttable presumption.
We may assume from this statement that
gifts made for purposes other than a reduction
of estate taxes, even though within three years
of death, would be recognized as valid ex
clusions from the donor’s estate. For example,
gifts that have been made periodically for
the benefit of incapacitated or indigent bene
ficiaries would be considered transfers result
ing from life-associated motivations.

This issue of the Tax Forum will discuss
three recent decisions by the U. S. Court of
Appeals in the 5th, 7th and 9th Circuits and
will review their effect on lifetime gifts, Sub
chapter S elections and gift-leasebacks of pro
perty between parents and minor children.

Established Lifetime Motive for Gifts
A recent decision by the U. S. Court of Ap
peals, 5th Circuit (First National Bank at Lub
bock, Tx. v. U. S., (CA-5) 7/12/72) empha
sizes the importance of establishing lifetime
motives for gifts made within three years of
death. This case points up the fact that even a
young and healthy donor should generate evi
dence of life-associated purposes other than
“love and affection” if he or she hopes to have
the transferred property escape the application
of Sec. 2035. This section provides that the
value of a gross estate shall be all property of
the decedent, including any that has been trans
ferred to others in contemplation of his death.
Sec. 2035(b) states in part: “If the decedent
within a period of three years ending with the
date of his death. . . . transferred an interest
in property .... such transfer .... shall, un
less shown to the contrary, be deemed to have
been made in contemplation of death within
the meaning of this section. . . .” The burden
of proof rests squarely on the taxpayer and it,
therefore, behooves any donor of property to
structure the pattern of giving in such a way
that a clear lifetime motive is indicated.
In the present case the decedent, Mrs. Vera
Harrell, age 61 and at the time in apparent
good health, had consulted her attorney less
than six months prior to her death regarding
the preparation of a will. The total value of
her estate indicated a potential inheritance tax
of approximately $128,000. Mrs. Harrell ap
parently expressed some consternation at the
size of the tax her estate would generate and
was advised that she could reduce this tax
liability by gifting some of her property.
Following this consultation Mrs. Harrell
made four gifts to her daughter totalling in
excess of $95,450, all within the four-month
period before her death. Upon review of the
facts, the Court of Appeals reversed the dis
trict court’s judgment in favor of the taxpayer

Pseudo—Corporation (Sub S) StatusSecond Class of Stock
One of the qualifications for electing and
maintaining Subchapter S status is the require
ment that a “small business corporation” does
not have more than one class of stock issued
and outstanding. In another recent case (Port
age Plastics Co., Inc. v. U.S. (CA-7) 7/18/72)
the Court of Appeals, this time the 7th Circuit,
has reversed a district court decision and found
that loans from nonstockholders constituted a
second class of stock.
In the past many Sub S elections have been
challenged because of “thin” loans by stock
holders; i.e., a high debt to equity ratio as was
the case with Portage Plastics. Until this de
cision by the 7th Circuit Court, the Treasury
had been rather unsuccessful in reclassifying
“thin” stockholder loans as a second class of
stock even when the loans were considered
equity rather than debt. The tax court and
several district courts had consistently re
jected the second class of stock theory both
under the old Regulations, which attempted to
classify pro rata “thin” loans as such, and under
the present amended Regulations, which
classify only non-pro rata loans as a second
class of stock. (Reg. 1.1371-1 (g)).
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Gift—Lease hack of Property

In the Portage Plastics case, the company
had borrowed $12,500 from each of two non
stockholders in exchange for standard note
forms paying interest in the amount of five
percent of the corporation’s annual net profit
before taxes. The agreement was entered into
on June 1, 1957 (date of corporate organiza
tion) and the sums were advanced to the
company between then and December 16,
1957. In June 1963 the notes were exchanged
for 245 shares each of the company’s common
stock. During the intervening years interest
had been paid as required by the terms of the
instruments.
The lower court had determined that the
loans in question were in fact equity in the
form of contributions to the capital of the
corporation rather than evidences of debt.
Again, however, it had rejected the second
class of stock theory.
The Court of Appeals concurred with the
equity assumption based upon the following
facts:

In Brooke v U. S. (CA-9 7/26/72) the U.S.
Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit upheld the deci
sion of the district court in finding that a gift
leaseback of property between a parent and his
minor children was a valid transaction, that the
income from the transferred property was re
portable by the children, and that as a courtappointed guardian the father was equivalent
to an independent trustee.
Dr. Brooke, a Montana physician, deeded
real estate including his office, a pharmacy,
and a rental apartment to his six minor chil
dren. The Montana Court appointed him as
guardian and in that capacity he collected
rents from the property, including rent from
his own office, and applied the monies received
to his children’s insurance, health and educa
tion.
The 9th Circuit found that there was a valid
gift and leaseback entitling the doctor to de
duct his rental payments as a business ex
pense under Sec. 162(a) (3) because: (1)
the transfer of the property was absolute and
irrevocable; (2) as donor he retained no con
trol over the property except as a tenant
without lease; (3) the trust benefits did not
inure to the doctor; and (4) as a court-ap
pointed guardian under Montana law he was
considered to have the requisite independence.
The court further found that the taxpayer’s de
sire to provide for the health and education of
his children, avoid friction with the other
partners in his medical practice, and remove
his assets from threats of malpractice suits
were non-tax motives well grounded in eco
nomic reality.
One of the more interesting aspects of this
case is the determination that Dr. Brooke was
not legally obligated to furnish his children
with the items of support for which the rental
income was used. Sec. 677 (b) of the Code
provides that income of a trust shall not be
considered taxable to the grantor unless it is
used for the support or maintenance of a
beneficiary whom the grantor is legally obli
gated to support or maintain. Here, the dis
trict court had determined that local law ap
plied. Montana law provides: “The parent
entitled to custody of a child must give him
support and education suitable to his circum
stances.” The court held that private school
tuition, musical instruments, music lessons and
a Scout automobile were beyond minimal
compliance with the requirements of local
law.

1. There was no provision for repayment of
the amounts advanced in event of de
fault on “interest” payments.
2. The “interest” was in relation to and
paid out of profits.
3. No funds had been provided by Portage
Plastics for the retirement of the obli
gations.
4. The notes had been subordinated in
favor of certain bank loans.

In ruling that there was a second class of
stock, the Appeals Court found that all of these
factors tended to support the position that the
holders of the obligations enjoyed rights or
interests different from and in preference to the
holders of the nominal (authorized common)
stock and, therefore, the equity could be con
sidered a second class of stock according to the
provisions of Regulation 1.1371-1(g).
This decision by the 7th Circuit Court may
encourage an agent when examining a pseudo
corporation to review all loans made in previ
ous years. Should the agent find just one nonpro rata “thin” loan, even for a brief period,
that can be labeled “equity,” the Sub S elec
tion could be nullified from that date forward.
Destroying the election might have severe tax
implications for both the corporation and for
the shareholders who reported the corporate
income (or loss) on their individual returns
and paid the tax or received the deduction in
the year reported.
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